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We use the best available longitudinal data set, the Health and Retirement Study, and a
battery of causal inference methods to provide both central estimates and bounds for the
long-term effect of health insurance on health and mortality among the near-elderly (ini-
tial age 50–61) over a 20-year period. Compared with matched insured persons, those
uninsured in 1992 consume fewer health-care services, but their health (while alive) does
not deteriorate relative to the insured, and, in our central estimates, they do not die sig-
nificantly faster than the insured. Our upper and lower bounds suggest that prior studies
have greatly overestimated the health andmortality benefits of providing health insurance
to the uninsured.
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I. Introduction
We estimate the long-term effect of health insurance on mortality, health while alive, and
health-care utilization, for the near-elderly in the United States. We study the near-elderly
(initial age from 50 to 61 when first observed in 1992) because they are the group for
whom an effect of health insurance on mortality and health is most likely to be found: the
elderly are all insured; the young are healthier. We use (1) the best available longitudinal
data set for studying the near-elderly, the Health and Retirement Study; (2) a long time
series from initial observation in 1992 through 2012; and (3) a battery of modern causal
inference methods.
The effect of health insurance on health outcomes is of high policy salience. The Af-
fordable Care Act 2010 is a major investment in expanding access to health insurance. An
importantmotive for this investment is the belief that, in President BarackObama’s words,
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access to health insurance is “life-or-death stuff. Tens of thousands of Americans die each
year just because they don’t have health insurance” (Goodnough, Pear, and Perez-Peña
2013, A1). That claim is based on prior “pure observational studies,” which find that lack
of health insurance predicts much higher mortality.1
An initial question is whether a pure observational study, such as ours, is a useful re-
search design for studying the effects of health insurance on health and mortality, given
the potential for selection bias in such a study, arising from unobserved differences be-
tween the insured and the uninsured. For studying long-term effects of health insurance,
we believe the answer is yes: a pure observational study is the best design that is currently
available—or likely to be available in the foreseeable future. Several studies use experi-
mental and quasi-experimental designs to study the short-term effects of health insurance
on mortality. Most find small effects. However, the long-term effects of insurance could
well be larger than any short-term effects. There have been no long-term experimental or
quasi-experimental studies of long-term effects.
Relative to prior observational studies, we make progress on—but do not solve, nor
claim to—the core challenge posed by selection bias. We (1) use a more complete set of
covariates; (2) use amuch longer time period; (3) show how estimates vary with time since
initial observation; (4) provide both central estimates (from comparing the uninsured to
all insured, whether privately or publicly insured), and upper and lower bounds on those
estimates (from comparing the uninsured separately to the privately insured and the pub-
licly insured); (5) provide separate estimates for the uninsured and the insured; and (6) use
a battery of methods rather than only one, to assess whether our estimates are sensitive to
choice of method.
We measure insurance status at initial observation in 1992, consider the uninsured to
be treated, and compare them to three control groups: the privately insured (below, “pri-
vate controls”), the publicly insured (“public controls”), and all insured (“all controls”).
We estimate the value of insurance for the uninsured (the average treatment effect for
the treated, or ATT), the already insured (the average treatment effect for the controls,
or ATC), and the whole sample (the average treatment effect, or ATE). The ATT estimates
address the value of insuring the currently uninsured, and thus are likely to be of principal
policy interest.
We find no evidence that the uninsured die significantly faster than the insured, for at
least 14 years after initial observation. Our central ATT estimates for the extra mortality
of the uninsured, compared with all insured, are close to zero. We find mild evidence of
higher mortality after 16–20 years in some specifications. However, this apparent higher
mortality is not statistically significant in our principal specification, in which we use in-
verse propensity weights (IPW) plus linear regression. In this specification, the coefficient
on an uninsurance dummy is 0.017 (t = 1.03) after 16 years and 0.028 (t = 1.64) after
20 years. We can also compute hazard rates: the mortality rate for the uninsured, divided
by the mortality rate for the insured. Those hazard rates are 1.06 at 16 years and 1.07 at
1 The principal studies are Franks, Clancy, and Gold (1993); McWilliams et al. (2004); Hadley andWaid-
mann (2006); Baker, Sudano, et al. (2006); andWilper et al. (2009). Kronick (2009) finds no significant effect
of insurance on mortality.
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20 years.With a simpler specification—IPWwithout regression—the hazard rates are even
closer to 1 (equal mortality)—1.00 at 16 years and 1.02 at 20 years.
We also compare the health of the uninsured to that of the insured, while still alive.
We find no evidence that the uninsured become less healthy over time, across an array of
measures of health status.
We find evidence of treatment heterogeneity—different estimates of the value of in-
surance for the insured and the uninsured. The estimated value of insurance in reducing
mortality for the insured, although statistically insignificant is generally higher than the
estimated value for the currently insured. This is consistent with persons with more to
gain from being insured often managing to obtain insurance.
We find, consistent with prior studies, that being uninsured reduces health-care uti-
lization. The uninsured visit the doctor and are admitted to a hospital less often, are less
likely to have prescription drugs prescribed, and are more likely not to take prescribed
drugs for financial reasons. This lower use in earlier years does not lead to higher use once
the initially uninsured reach Medicare age.
In the Online Appendix, available on the journal website (see http://www.mitpress
journals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/ajhe_a_00076) andon SSRN,we reconcile our resultswith
what we view as the best prior observational study, McWilliams et al. (2004) (below
MZMA). MZMA use the same data set we do, and find a large mortality benefit from
health insurance, measured eight years after initial observation (hazard rate = 1.43; 95
percent confidence interval, CI,= [1.10, 1.85]). MZMA and other prior studies that reach
similar conclusions overestimate the benefits of health insurance because of a combina-
tion of (1) comparing the uninsured only to the privately insured; (2) employing weaker
controls for selection into health insurance status; and (3) failing to allow for treatment
effect heterogeneity.
The confidence intervals for our central ATT estimates versus all insured do not rule
out moderate effects of health insurance, but do exclude the point estimates from most
prior studies. For example, our central 10-year ATT hazard ratio estimate, for the unin-
sured versus all insured, is 1.02 (95 percent CI = [0.87, 1.17]). The upper end of the 95
percent CI is well below MZMA’s point estimate of 1.43.
We bound our central estimates, obtained by comparing the uninsured with all in-
sured, by comparing the uninsured separately with the privately insured and the publicly
insured. The privately insured appear healthier than the uninsured, based on the covari-
ates we can observe. It is likely that they are also healthier based on other covariates we
cannot observe (positive selection). If so, we would expect them to live longer than the
uninsured, even if both groups were insured or both groups were uninsured. Conversely,
the publicly insured would likely die sooner than the uninsured if they were also unin-
sured (negative selection). Consistent with these priors, ATT estimates for the uninsured
versus the publicly insured are often (though not always) negative, albeit usually statisti-
cally insignificant. Thus, comparing the uninsured separately with the privately insured
and the publicly insured can provide rough upper and lower bounds on the true ATT.
Those bounds are [−0.029, 0.020] at 10 years and [−0.039, 0.052] at 20 years.2 The upper
2 The lower bound is given by the coefficient versus the publicly insured minus one standard deviation,
and the upper bound is the coefficient versus the privately insured plus one standard deviation.
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bounds are well below the point estimates from most prior studies. Moreover, the lower
bounds from comparing the uninsured with public controls are much higher (closer to
zero) than point estimates obtained using MZMA’s methods. These tighter bounds sug-
gest that while some selection effects probably remain, their magnitude is well below that
in prior studies.
Another way to assess the importance of selection effects, and thus the credibility of
our estimates, relies on the time dimension. Our ATT estimates of extra mortality for the
uninsured versus all insured suggest that the effect of having health insurance in 1992 on
future mortality is near zero through age 14, and provide mild evidence that insurance
slightly reduces mortality after 16–20 years after initial observation. Yet by year 16, the
sample mean age is 72, well above the Medicare-eligibility age of 65. Our priors, when
we began this study, were that any impact of prior uninsurance on mortality would de-
cline once most of the sample was covered by Medicare. Our ATT estimates instead rise.
This suggests that the insured (most of whom are privately insured) may have unobserved
characteristics that predict longer-term longevity.
Despite the likely presence of some remaining selection effects, we contribute to the
literature on whether and how health insurance affects health and mortality in several
ways. First, we bring estimates for the uninsured versus private and public controls closer
to each other and thus provide tighter bounds on the likely true effect of health insurance
on mortality. Second, we show that treatment heterogeneity is important, and provide
estimates that allow for heterogeneity. Third, we estimate the effects of health insurance
over time. Fourth, we assess the sensitivity of our estimates across several causal inference
methods, rather than using a single method. Across methods and measures, health insur-
ance moderately increases use of health-care services, but we find only weak evidence that
uninsurance predicts either worse health or higher mortality.
There are two important caveats for our study. First, we measure insurance status in
1992, at the inception of theHealth and Retirement Study.We cannotmeasure the effect of
long-term uninsurance because the sample of long-term uninsured is too small. Second,
enhanced access to health insurance could improve longevity for some segments of the
population but not others. In particular, our study might find small effects of expanding
health insurance because those whomost need insurance often obtain it, and because fed-
eral law ensures emergency care to all who need it, insured or not. This paper proceeds as
follows. Section II provides a literature review anddiscussesmethodological concernswith
prior studies. Section III discusses our data and estimation methods. Section IV presents
our principal results for mortality. Section V presents results for health-care utilization
and health. Section VI discusses some implications of our results; Section VII concludes.
An Online Appendix provides additional results.
II. Literature Review and Methodological Background
We review in this section the principal prior studies of the impact of health insurance on
mortality. See Dor and Umapathi (2014) for a more complete review. We discuss in later
sections studies of the impact of health insurance on health-care utilization and on health
while alive.
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A. PR IOR PURE OBSERVAT IONAL STUD IES
Much of the research and policy analysis on the value of health insurance relies on pure
observational studies. A well-known example is an Institute of Medicine (IOM 2002) re-
port, which estimates that uninsurance increases mortality by 25 percent, implying 18,000
lives saved in 2001.3 This and similar estimates have played a prominent role in the policy
debate over expanding access to health insurance.
All prior studies compare the uninsured with the privately insured, exclude the pub-
licly insured, and estimate only ATE. Franks, Clancy, and Gold (1993) use the NHANES
survey and find 25 percent higher risk of mortality among the uninsured (95 percent CI
= [1.00, 1.55]).4 McWilliams et al. (2004) (below, MZMA) is, in our judgment, the best
of the studies that finds large mortality gains from health insurance. Because it is the best
and uses the same Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) data set we use, we discuss their
results in detail in the Online Appendix, and contrast our results to theirs. MZMA use
the first five waves of the HRS (1992–2000). They estimate each person’s propensity to
be insured and use the propensity scores to reweight the sample. If selection only on ob-
servables (SOO) is satisfied, propensity score reweighting can produce unbiased treatment
effect estimates.
Hadley andWaidmann (2006) use a subset of theHRSwhowere uninsured or had pri-
vate or Veterans Administration (VA, here and below, including CHAMPUS) insurance.
They assume that the impact of uninsurance on health is proportional to the number of
waves in which a respondent is uninsured. Hadley and Waidmann estimate that being
continuously uninsured would increase mortality by an implausible factor of 3.3 times.
However, Kronick (2006) criticizes the plausibility of their instruments and other aspects
of their methods.5
Baker, Sudano, et al. (2006) study the first six waves of the HRS. In regression analyses,
uninsurance predicts 35 percent highermortality risk (95 percentCI= [1.2, 1.62]), relative
to the privately insured. Wilper et al. (2009) use NHANES and find 40 percent higher
mortality for the uninsured (95 percent CI = [1.06, 1.84]).6 In contrast, Kronick (2009)
3 The Institute of Medicine draws principally on Franks, Clancy, and Gold (1993) (discussed in text) and
Sorlie et al. (1994) (not discussed because they do not control for health status). Dorn (2008) and Families
USA (2012) use the IOM estimate of a 25 percent increase in mortality risk and provide larger, updated
estimates of annual lives saved.
4 NHANES is the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. For details on the NHANES series,
see http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/surveys.htm.
5 Their instrumental variables are spouse’s union membership, immigrant status, years in the United
States if foreign born, and involuntary job loss in last five years. None are likely to satisfy the “exclusion
restriction” that the instrument must predict health status only through insurance, not directly or through
an omitted variable (such as income orwealth, which they oddly do not use as covariates). A number of other
studies also use instrumental variables (see the review by Dor and Umapathi (2014)). We are not convinced
that any satisfy the exclusion restriction.
6 Wilper et al. (2009) report that in robustness checks, they added a propensity score to their regression
model. This will not produce unbiased treatment effect estimates, even under unconfounded assignment.
See Wooldridge (2010, eq. 21.52), for a correct approach.
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uses data from the National Health Insurance Survey, linked to mortality records, and
finds no significant relation between mortality and private insurance.
Polsky et al. (2009) use the HRS to estimate transition probabilities for changes in
health status and find no evidence that reaching Medicare age significantly affects these
probabilities for the previously uninsured. Dor, Sudano, and Baker (2006) find small, gen-
erally insignificant improvements in a summary health measure for the uninsured over
the first four years of the HRS in OLS regressions.7 Baker, Feinglass, et al. (2006) report
that overall health improves for the uninsured in the first HRS wave when they are first
covered by Medicare, relative to the previously insured, but small gains in the next wave.
Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) study the Massachusetts coverage expansion in 2006
and find statistically significant but “economically” very small gains in self-reported health
and some other health outcomes, for Massachusetts relative to control states.
All of these studies raise methodological concerns. First, almost all compare the unin-
sured with the privately insured, and exclude the publicly insured. The asserted justifi-
cation, from MZMA, is that “Adults with public insurance were likely to have qualifying
medical conditions (for example, end-stage renal disease) or disabilities not fully mea-
sured by the HRS that could have biased our results” (225). The publicly insured indeed
have higher mortality than the uninsured. But to exclude them undermines the basis for
causal inference. If assignment is confounded for the uninsured versus the publicly in-
sured, one cannot credibly assert that it is unconfounded for the uninsured versus the
privately insured.
B. EXPER IMENTAL AND QUAS I -EXPER IMENTAL STUD IES
OF SHORT-TERM EFFECTS
Several studies exploit randomized or natural experiments, and address whether insur-
ance affects near-term health or mortality. These studies do not assess long-term effects.
The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment studies Medicaid expansion. It finds small, sta-
tistically insignificant effects of health insurance on mortality and on most measures of
health over the two years for which the experiment ran.8 Weathers and Stegman (2012)
study a randomized experiment in which some uninsured Social Security Disability In-
surance recipients received Medicare immediately, while others had to wait two years for
coverage, and find no significant effect of earlier insurance on mortality.
Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2009) and Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) exploit the
discontinuity in health insurance coverage at age 65, when all US citizens and permanent
residents becomeMedicare-eligible, to assess the impact of health insurance on mortality.
7 Dor, Sudano, and Baker (2006) find a much larger improvement in an instrumental variable analysis,
but we do not view their instruments (state marginal income tax rates, percentage of state workers who
belong to unions, and unemployment rate) as credible. Hadley andWaidmann (2006), discussed above, also
use implausible instruments, and find that the health of the uninsured deteriorates prior to age 65. Earlier
studies using shorter time periods include Baker et al. (2001, 2002) and Kasper, Giovannini, and Hoffman
(2000).
8 See Allen et al. (2010), Finkelstein et al. (2012), and Baicker et al. (2013). This study found that the
insured are less likely to be depressed, but no other significant changes in health.
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They find no evidence of a fall in overall mortality at age 65. This null result is implicit
in the published version of Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2008), but explicit in their NBER
working paper (2004). Card, Dobkin, andMaestas (2009) find a small post-65 reduction in
mortality following emergency hospital admission. Chay, Kim, and Swaminathan (2010)
find a reduction in mortality at age 65 when Medicare is introduced in the 1960s, but this
effect weakens over time. Lichtenberg (2002) find a reduction in mortality at age 65, but
Kronick (2009) reports, citingDow (2004), that this is an artifact of how the Social Security
Administration constructs the life tables that Lichtenberg used. Polsky et al. (2009) find
no reduction in mortality risk for the previously uninsured after they become Medicare-
eligible. In Japan, Shigeoka (2014) finds little effect on health or mortality from a sharp
reduction in patient cost-sharing at age 70.
Sommers, Baicker, and Epstein (2012) use a differences-in-differences (DiD) design
to study general Medicaid expansions in three states. They find large mortality gains in
New York, positive but insignificant mortality gains for Arizona, and higher mortality for
Maine. Sommers, Long, and Baicker (2014) find large mortality gains in Massachusetts
following its health insurance expansion in 2007. Some of the point estimates in these pa-
pers are far too large to be due to health insurance alone. For example, Sommers, Long,
and Baicker (2014) estimate a drop in health-care amenable mortality of 4.5 percent, and a
6.8 percent drop in the uninsurance rate. If lower mortality was entirely among the newly
insured, aWald estimate suggests a 4.5 percent/0.068= 66 percent drop in amenablemor-
tality for the newly insured, within two years after gaining coverage. This is implausible
and inconsistent with the short-term studies cited above. It may be that single- or several-
state DiD analyses using aggregate data cannot provide reliable estimates of the impact of
health insurance on mortality.
Finally, several studies focus onMedicaid insurance expansions for particular groups,
notably children and pregnant women, and find health gains from these interventions (on
pregnant women and newborns, see, for example, Currie and Gruber (1996); on children,
see, for example, Dafny and Gruber (2005), Goodman-Bacon (2013), Brown, Kowalski,
and Lurie (forthcoming), and Miller and Wherry (2015)).
These studies do not address whether insurance affects health or mortality for other
groups of people. In short, experimental and quasi-experimental studies have not reached
a consensus on mortality gains from health insurance, tend to focus on only narrow seg-
ments of the population, and usually study only short-term effects.
III. Data, Sample Trimming, and Estimation Methods
A. DATA SET AND COVAR IATES
We use HRS waves 1 (1992) through 11 (2012). This sample includes individuals who are
age 50–61 in 1992; thus all turn 65 and become Medicare-eligible between 4 and 15 years
after initial observation.9 The full sample is 10,242 individuals surveyed at wave 1. We
9 For those familiar with the HRS, we include respondents from HRS cohorts 1 and 11, and limit the
sample to respondents who are ages 50–61 in 1992.
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exclude 455 people without insurance information and 151 people who lacked data on
some covariates at wave 1. This left a usable sample at wave 1 of 9,636 people, including
7,251with private insurance (either provided through employment or privately purchased;
some also have public insurance), 949 with only public insurance (Medicare, Medicaid,
VA, or other government program), and 1,436 uninsured.
We began with the 27 covariates used by MZMA (many are binned; they use 71 vari-
ables). We drop several that are likely to be strongly influenced by insurance status (the
most obvious are “doctor visit in last 12 months” and “hospital stay in last 12 months”),
add granularity to others, and add additional covariates that we considered likely to af-
fect insurance, health, or mortality, and did not impose a large loss in sample size due to
missing values. With binning, we use 144 variables.
The extensive covariates in the HRS hopefully allow us to come close to satisfying the
core requirement for unbiased estimates, that insurance is as good as randomly assigned,
conditional on observed covariates. This is often called “unconfounded assignment” (Im-
bens andRubin 2015) or “selection [only] on observables” (SOO).However, it is likely that,
to some extent, unobservables still predict both insurance status and mortality, which can
be called “selection on unobservables” or SOU.We expect some positive selection (health-
ier persons are insured), andhence upward-biased estimates ofmortality gains fromhealth
insurance, when comparing the uninsured with the privately insured, and negative selec-
tion when comparing the uninsured to the publicly insured.
Table 1 provides a covariate balance table for selected covariates, for the uninsured
versus private controls. As expected, we find large differences onmany covariates between
uninsured and privately insured individuals.10 However, once we use inverse propen-
sity weights to balance the treated and control groups, we obtain good balance on all
covariates—all normalized differences are 0.07 or less.
B. SAMPLE TR IMMING
We use a logit model with the 144 covariates to estimate the probability that an individual
is uninsured. Most of the privately insured have a very high likelihood to be insured. In
contrast, the propensities for the uninsured are well spread.11 This imbalance causes two
problems. First, methods for estimating treatment effects that rely on inverse propensity
score reweighting (the ATEweights are 1/pi for the treated, where pi = propensity if obser-
vation i to be treated; and [1/(1− pi)] for the controls) assign large weights to either treated
or control units near the tails of the propensity distribution. This increases the variance of
treatment effect estimates. Placing high weights on a limited number of observations can
also lead to unstable estimates (e.g., Kang and Schafer 2007).
10 Online Appendix Tables A1 andA2 provide full covariate balance tables for the uninsured versus private
and public controls, respectively. Using measures of initial health as covariates is potentially problematic
since some could be affected by past or present uninsurance. We therefore also used a specification, which
does not control for initial health, and report results in Online Appendix Figure I1. Results are similar to
those we report in the text.
11 Online Appendix Table B1 shows the marginal effect of each covariate on the propensity to be treated
(uninsured). Online Appendix Figure B1 shows kernel density plots for the propensity to be uninsured.
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FIGURE 1. Propensities to be uninsured, after trimming
Notes: Kernel densities for probability of being uninsured (pi) after trimming. Trimming: We
exclude persons with propensity to be uninsured outside [0.05, 0.95], reestimate propensities, and
then trim to common support (p [0.040, 0.934] for uninsured vs. privately insured, leaving a
sample size of 4,986; p [0.041, 0.957] for uninsured vs. publicly insured, leaving a sample size of
2,018; and p [0.041, 0.928] for uninsured vs. all insured, leaving a sample size of 6,007). Insurance
status and covariates are measured at wave 1. Vertical lines are at p = 0.05 and p = 0.95.
Crump et al. (2009) find that trimming observations with high and low propensities
will usually reduce variance, despite reduced sample size. We trim the sample so that es-
timated propensities to be uninsured pi  [0.05, 0.95]. We then reestimate propensities
on the trimmed sample, then trim to “common support.” Covariate balance is improved,
but the privately insured mostly have low propensities to be uninsured, while the publicly
insured mostly have high propensities. We show kernel densities for the probability of be-
ing uninsured, after trimming, separately for the uninsured versus private controls, public
controls, and all controls in Figure 1.12 In robustness checks, our results are not sensitive
to the choice of trimming bounds.
C. EST IMAT ION METHODS
With MZMA as a partial exception, modern methods for estimating treatment effects in
“pure” observational studies, with no experimental or quasi-experimental control group,
have not previously been used to study the impact of health insurance on health ormortal-
ity. The methods generally rely on inverse propensity score reweighting, subclassification,
or matching, often combined with regression and sample trimming. We use the following
methods to estimate ATE, ATT, and ATC for the uninsured relative to private controls, to
public controls, and to all controls:
(1) “Univariate” analysis using IPW. Difference in weighted mean outcomes using in-
verse propensity weights (IPW).
(2) Multivariate linear analysis plus IPW. Least squares regression of outcomeonunin-
surance dummy plus covariates (a linear probability estimate), with IPW. This esti-
mator has the double robustness property noted by Robins and Rotnitzky (2001):
12 For the uninsured versus private controls, trimming modestly reduces the number of uninsured by 12
percent, to 1,313. The number of privately insured falls by 46 percent, to 3,832, but most dropped observa-
tions were poor matches for the uninsured.
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it will provide unbiased estimates if either the propensity score estimates or the
regression adjustments fully address SOU.
(3) Subclassification plus regression. We divide the sample into subclasses with equal
numbers of uninsured, based on propensity scores. Within each subclass, we
regress the outcome on covariates plus the propensity score, and then combine
the subclass estimates.
(4) Matching on log-odds propensities. To estimate ATT, we match each treated person
i to the control person jwith the closest value of ln(pi / (1− pi)), using one insured
match for each uninsured, with replacement.
(5) OLS regression. OLS (linear probability model) estimates of mortality on an unin-
surance dummy plus covariates. OLS assumes homogeneous treatment effects and
therefore provides only an ATE estimate.
We report results from methods (1) and (2) in the text. We find similar results with
the remaining methods, and report those results in the Online Appendix.13
D. WHAT EFFECT ARE WE MEASUR ING?
We measure the marginal effect of health insurance on health and mortality, against the
backdrop of an array of interventions in health care and health insurance markets. We
measure the effect of health insurance, not health care. Uninsured people can obtain care
in a variety of ways, including emergency care under EMTALA (Emergency Medical
Treatment andActive LaborAct); charity care frompublic or nonprofit hospitals or clinics;
workers’ compensation for on-the-job accidents; and auto insurance for injuries in auto
accidents. Many people can purchase some health care without insurance, using either
savings or borrowing. Many vulnerable populations are eligible for Medicare or Medicaid
insurance. Thus the health-care safety net has holes, but catches many people and health
conditions, and thus reduces the marginal gains from insuring the currently uninsured
(Hall 2011).
Wemeasure uninsurance at wave 1, in 1992.14 Implicitly, we treat uninsurance at initial
observation in 1992 as a proxy for a longer history of uninsurance or irregular insurance,
both past and future. Uninsurance, however, is often temporary. We show the proportion
of the initially uninsured who are also uninsured in each of the later waves in Figure 2.
Figure 2 contains separate lines for age cohorts. The age 60–61 cohort is partly Medicare-
eligible after four years (wave 3) and fully eligible after six years; the age 58–59 cohort is
13 In unreported robustness checks, we find similar results with several other methods, including Kaplan-
Meier survival analysis, and the Gutman and Rubin (2013) MITSS (multiple imputation with two splines
within subclasses) approach. We also attempted nearest-neighbor matching (Abadie and Imbens 2012), but
the estimates were sensitive to exactly how we defined our sample, which suggests that we may be “overfit-
ting” by matching on too many covariates.
14 The HRS asks respondents only: “Are you currently covered by [health] insurance?”
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FIGURE 2. Uninsurance status over time
Notes: Fraction of uninsured persons at initial observation in 1992, by age cohort in 1992, who were
uninsured in 1992 and in the indicated subsequent waves. Percentage uninsured at year 4 (wave 3)
includes persons who were insured in wave 2, and similar for later waves. Online Appendix, Figure
C1, provides a similar figure showing the proportion of each age cohort who were continuously
uninsured through each wave. Uninsurance rate drops effectively to zero as each cohort reaches
Medicare age (age 65). Sample: n = 1,440 uninsured persons included in Health and Retirement
Study, wave 1 (1992), initial age 50–61, uninsured in 1992. Denominator for each observation wave
is persons still alive at that time. Waves are two years apart. A respondent is uninsured if she reports
not being currently covered by health insurance at the time of the survey.
fully eligible after eight years, and so on. Among those under 65, roughly 60 percent are
uninsured after two years, and about half are uninsured after four years.15
We cannot use the HRS to directly assess whether long-term uninsurance has long-
term health effects—the number of long-term uninsured is too small. We can, however,
make some progress on this issue by comparing the twice uninsured (at wave 1 in 1992
and wave 2 in 1994) with the twice insured (in both 1992 and 1994), and to the once unin-
sured (in 1992 or 1994, but not both). The mortality trajectories for the twice uninsured,
versus the once uninsured, or the twice insured are similar to those in which we measure
uninsurance only in 1992 (Figure 4). In unreported results, we confirm that the health of
the once uninsured (in 1992 or 1994 but not both) is similar to the health of the twice
uninsured. These results suggest that uninsurance at initial observation in 1992 is likely
to be a reasonable proxy for longer-term uninsurance.
15 Some of the initially uninsured cycle in and out of having health insurance. In Online Appendix Figure
C1, we show the proportion of the initially insured in each age cohort that remains continuously uninsured
through each later wave.
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IV. Impact of Uninsurance on Mortality over Time
In this section, mortality, measured at each of waves 2–11, is the dependent variable. A
positive treatment effect implies that the uninsured die sooner than the insured. We focus
first on mortality because mortality has been the most studied outcome in the literature.
We present treatment effect estimates for mortality using a number of different methods.
A. UN IVAR IATE IPW EST IMATE
As an initial step, Table 2 reports the raw mortality rate for the uninsured versus each
control group, both unweighted and usingATTweights, for selected years.16 Consider first
the upper bound estimate, obtained by comparing the uninsuredwith the privately insured
(panel A). The uninsured have higher mortality in each wave, and the gap increases over
time. However, once we apply inverse propensity weights, the gaps shrink and most are
statistically insignificant. One can also construct a crude hazard rate by taking a ratio of
the mortality rates of the two groups. Let f uninst (ATT ) be the fraction of uninsured who
have died by year t, using ATT weights, and similarly for the insured. A univariate hazard









That is, after eight years the hazard rate is 1.15. At year 20, the univariate hazard rate at
year 20 is similar, at 1.12.
Consider next the lower bound estimate, from comparing the uninsured with the pub-
licly insured (panel B). In earlierwaves, the publicly insured die sooner than the uninsured,
even after using IPW. However, the differences between groups are not statistically signif-
icant and shrink in later waves. At year 20, the difference in mortality is 1.47 percent (t =
0.36) and the hazard rate is close to one (0.97), implying neither an economically impor-
tant nor a statistically significant difference between the two groups. These results, taken
as a whole, are consistent with modest positive selection for the privately insured versus
the uninsured (the privately insured are healthier for unobserved reasons), which affects
mortality only in later waves; and modest negative selection for the publicly insured ver-
sus the uninsured, which shrinks in later waves. This suggests that these selection effects
might roughly offset each other if we compare the uninsured with all insured.
We next compare the uninsured to “all insured” (panel C). We have 1,335 uninsured
and 4,672 insured after trimming, of which 3,986 (85 percent) are privately insured. Thus,
the “all insured” controls are weighted toward the privately insured. With ATT weights,
mortality is slightly, but not statistically significantly, lower for the uninsured through 16
years after initial observation. Uninsured mortality rises in years 18–20, relative to the
16 We present results for all waves and results with ATC weights in the Online Appendix, Table D1.
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FIGURE 3. Mortality of uninsured, relative to insured (linear analysis, inverse
propensity weights)
Notes: ATT and ATC estimates from linear regression of mortality on treatment (uninsurance)
dummy and covariates, using inverse propensity weights. ATT weights are 1 for uninsured;
pi/(1−pi) for insured; ATC weights are (1−pi)/pi for uninsured; 1 for insured. Graph shows point
estimates and 90 percent CI. Horizontal axis shows years since wave 1. Sample is HRS wave 1, after
trimming. See Figure 1 for trimming process and sample sizes. Insurance status and covariates are
measured at wave 1 (year 0). Covariates are listed in Table A1 in the Online Appendix.
insured, but the difference remains insignificant. At 20 years, the uninsured have 0.96 per-
cent higher mortality (t = 0.43). The associated hazard rate is 1.02, only slightly greater
than one.
We present ATC estimates in the Online Appendix, Table D1. The hazard rates are
generally larger than the ATT estimates, although the difference shrinks in later waves.17
These differences provide evidence of treatment effect heterogeneity and confirm the im-
portance of examining ATT and ATC separately. The larger ATC estimates suggest that
anymortality gains from insurance are larger for those who have insurance—in effect sug-
gesting that those who will gain from being insured often find a way to obtain insurance.
B. L INEAR REGRESS ION PLUS IPW
We turn next to multivariate estimates that combine IPW with second-stage regression
of the outcome variable on covariates. We present ATT and ATC estimates in Figure 3.
We present six graphs; each shows point estimates and a 90 percent confidence interval
(CI) for each wave. Consider first the leftmost set of graphs, in which we compare the
uninsured with private controls. The ATT estimate is near zero through 12 years, but then
17 After 10 years, the ATC hazard rate versus all insured is 1.14, versus an ATT rate of 0.95. But after 20
years the ATC hazard rate is 1.06, only slightly above the ATT rate of 1.02.
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gradually increases and becomes statistically significant after 18 years (coeff. = 0.039; t =
2.06) before falling to 0.032 (t = 1.65) in year 20.
An increasing effect of health insurance over time is possible under unconfounded as-
signment, but for our sample, this would be an odd pattern. Our prior was that any treat-
ment effect would likely weaken once most of the sample reached Medicare age. By year
10 the mean age for our sample is 66. Instead the ATT estimate increases well after most
of the sample has reached Medicare age. This rise could be due to the gradual emergence
of health problems that could have been prevented by earlier preventive care, but it could
also reflect the slow emergence of an impact on mortality of selection on unobservables.
The uninsured have lower mortality in all waves than the publicly insured (Figure 3,
middle graphs), but the ATT point estimates are small inmagnitude and never statistically
significant. The ATC estimates bounce a fair amount from wave to wave, which we view
as suggesting an imperfect specification.
Weprovide our central estimate, from comparing the uninsuredwith all insured, in the
right-hand charts in Figure 3. The ATT estimates are close to zero though 14 years, then
rise to 0.028 by year 20, but remain insignificant (t = 1.64). These estimates support, at
most, a modest, slow-to-emerge mortality benefit from insurance for the currently unin-
sured, with slowly emerging SOU as an alternate explanation.
We can also use the regression coefficients to compute a regression-based hazard
rate. Let βuninst (ATT ) be the regression coefficient for uninsured mortality at year t and
f insuredt (ATT ) be the fraction of insured who have died by year t, using ATT weights. A





The 10-year ATT hazard ratio estimate versus all insured is 1.02 (95 percent CI = [0.87,
1.17]); this rises after 20 years to 1.07 (95 percent CI = [0.99, 1.15]).
In broad measure, the multivariate results, using IPW plus regression, are similar to
the univariate results using IPW alone. The ATT estimates versus private controls and
versus public controls are closer to zero when we include covariates. The univariate and
multivariate ATT estimates versus all controls are similar.
C. UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS
We can use the information in Figure 3 to develop rough upper and lower bounds on our
central ATT estimate. We expect positive selection for the uninsured versus private con-
trols, and negative selection for the uninsured versus public controls. We therefore define
an upper bound as the ATT estimate versus private controls, plus one standard devia-
tion, and a lower bound as the ATT estimate versus public controls, minus one standard
deviation.18
18 Wepresent the central estimate, plus these bounds, inOnlineAppendix Figure E1. The use of two control
groups, with opposite selection biases, to bound treatment effects was proposed by Rosenbaum (1987).
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FIGURE 4. Mortality of twice uninsured, relative to twice insured and once
insured (linear analysis with IPW)
Notes: ATT estimates from linear regression with IPW of mortality on twice uninsured treatment
dummy (uninsured at waves 1 and 2) and covariates. Graphs show point estimates and 90 percent
CI. Sample is HRS wave 1, excluding persons who died by wave 2. Trimming: We exclude persons
with propensity to be twice uninsured outside [0.05, 0.95], reestimate propensities, and then trim to
common support. Sample for twice uninsured (treated) vs. twice privately insured (control): nt =
771; nc = 2,092; vs. twice publicly insured: nt = 629; nc = 607; vs. all twice insured: nt = 809; nc=
2,682; vs. once insured: nt = 894; nc = 867. Covariates are measured at wave 1 and are listed in
Table A1 in the Online Appendix. Horizontal axis shows years since wave 1.
These bounds also generate bounds on hazard rates: after 10 years, these bounds are
[0.85, 1.14]; after 20 years, the bounds are [0.91, 1.14]. The upper bound estimate is con-
sistent with an “economically” important effect of health insurance on mortality. At the
same time, it is far below prior point estimates in the literature, such as the 1.43 estimate
after eight years presented by MZMA.
D. LONGER-TERM UNINSURANCE
Uninsurance is often temporary (Figure 2). Uninsurance in 1992 is thus an imperfect
proxy for being uninsured for a sustained period of time. Would there be a larger effect of
uninsurance on health for persons who are more regularly uninsured? We provide some
evidence on that question in Figure 4. We present ATT estimates, using IPW plus regres-
sion, in which we compare the twice uninsured (in both 1992 and 1994) to the twice in-
sured and to the once uninsured (insured in 1992 or 1994 but not both).
The extra mortality of the twice uninsured, versus the twice privately insured, is near
zero at years 4–8, tilts up to around 5 percent at years 14–16, before falling to 2 percent at
year 20 (Figure 4, top left chart). The confidence intervals are larger than in prior figures
because of a smaller sample.Whenwe compare the twice uninsuredwith the twice publicly
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insured, the twice uninsured have somewhat higher mortality, but all point estimates are
insignificant.
The bottom left chart shows ATT estimates for the twice uninsured versus the twice
insured (any type of insurance). The estimates are similar to those for the once uninsured
versus all insured in Figure 3—small through year 14, with somewhat higher, but still
insignificant, estimates in years 16–20. Much as for the once insured, this late rise in mor-
tality could reflect either a delayed effect of insurance onmortality or a delayed emergence
of SOU.
Finally, the bottom right chart in Figure 4 provides ATT estimates for the twice unin-
sured versus the once uninsured. The point estimates are generally negative, consistent
with the twice uninsured being unobservably somewhat healthier than the once unin-
sured. Thus, while uninsurance at wave 1 is an imperfect proxy for longer-term unin-
surance or irregular insurance, we cannot meaningfully improve on this proxy by using
uninsurance at successive waves to define the treatment group.
V. Other Outcomes: Health-Care Utilization and Health
We turn in this part to whether uninsurance predicts health-care utilization (Section A),
or health outcomes other thanmortality (Section B).We present ATT estimates using IPW
plus linear regression. ATC estimates and estimates using other methods are similar.
A. EFFECT OF UN INSURANCE ON HEALTH-CARE UT IL I ZAT ION
The uninsured, if provided with insurance, are known to consume more health-care ser-
vices. We provide additional evidence on this issue below. We also address a less-studied
question: will the previously uninsured consume more or less health care than the previ-
ously insured, once both groups are insured at age 65? The only prior study that addresses
this question is a separate McWilliams et al. (2007b) paper. The authors use the HRS, dis-
card the publicly insured, and compare the uninsured to persons with private insurance
for at least three waves before turning 65. They report that previously uninsured persons
with hypertension, diabetes, heart disease, or stroke have more doctor visits and hospital-
izations after age 65 than privately insured controls. Previously uninsured persons without
these conditions continue to have fewer visits and hospitalizations than their controls.
We present ATT estimates for the uninsured versus all insured, for six normalized
measures of health-care utilization (Figure 5).19 In earlier waves, the uninsured use some-
what fewer health-care services. The estimated effects rise in later waves, as the initially
uninsured become Medicare-eligible, but generally remain negative.
Consider the top left chart, for hospital admission. The outcome is a dummy variable
for whether the respondent was hospitalized in the last two years. The uninsured are 0.16
standard deviations less likely to be admitted to a hospital than the insured in 1992. After
that, hospitalization rates for the initially uninsured rise and roughly match those for the
initially insured in years 10–16, but then drop again in years 18–20; we have no good ex-
planation for this drop. The bottom left chart, for days in the hospital, is generally similar.
19 We normalize all measures to mean 0, standard deviation σ = 1.
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FIGURE 5. Health-care utilization, ATT (linear analysis with IPW)
Notes: ATT estimates from linear regression with IPW of indicated measures of health-care
utilization for each wave on treatment (uninsurance at wave 1) dummy and covariates. We
normalize each measure in each wave to mean 0, σ = 1. The control group is all insured persons.
The graphs show point estimates (as percentages of a standard deviation) and 90 percent CI.
Sample, trimming, covariates, and weights are the same as for Figure 3. Outcomes are whether the
respondent stayed in a hospital during the last two years; whether the respondent visited a doctor
during the last two years; whether the respondent has been prescribed any drug; how many nights
the respondent spent in a hospital during the last two years; how many times the respondent visited
a doctor during the last two years; and whether the respondent did not take prescribed drugs
for financial reasons (multiplied by −1 so positive values show taking prescribed drugs).
Horizontal axis is years since wave 1. Data on whether drugs were prescribed are available from
wave 2; data on whether prescriptions went unfilled for financial reasons are available from
wave 3.
Consider next the two middle charts, for doctor visits. In the early waves, the unin-
sured are much less likely to have seen a doctor in the last two years, and have fewer aver-
age visits. The “visited a doctor” point estimates rise toward zero beginning in year 6, but
remain negative for all years.
The top right chart reports the effect of being uninsured on whether any drugs were
prescribed in the last two years. The uninsured are substantially less likely to have received
a prescription in all waves, even after most reach Medicare age. Conditional on having a
prescription, they are more likely to have not filled the prescription for financial reasons
in early waves, but this effect disappears by year 16 (bottom right chart).
We thus find consistent evidence that, in the early waves, the uninsured receive less
care. This effect moderates but, for most measures, persists after they reach Medicare age.
Overall, as the initially uninsured become Medicare-eligible, they approach the ini-
tially insured in health-care use, but no more. There is no rebound effect, in which those
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uninsured before age 65 receive more health care once insured than those who were in-
sured all along. These results do not rule out a rebound for subgroups with particular
diseases, as found by McWilliams et al. (2007b).
The real but limited differences in care intensity reinforce one explanation for a small
estimated effect of insurance on mortality and health—we are measuring the marginal
effect of health insurance on health care and thus on health. The uninsured still obtain a
fair amount of health care. Much of the additional care they would receive if insured could
provide limited marginal benefit (Fuchs 2004).
B. EFFECT OF UN INSURANCE ON HEALTH AND D ISAB IL I T Y
We turn next towhether uninsurance predicts health outcomes other than death. A caveat:
we observe health only for those who are still alive. If insurance predicts higher survival,
but the extra survivors tend to be in poor health, estimates of the health impact of in-
surance will be biased toward poorer health. As we show above, however, these mortality
effects appear to be small.
No prior study of the impact of health insurance on health outcomes uses amatched, or
propensity score reweighted, sample of insured and uninsured. McWilliams et al. (2007a)
use the HRS and find post-age-65 improvements in several health measures for previ-
ously uninsured persons with cardiovascular disease or diabetes, relative to the previously
insured, but insignificant effects for other measures. However, instead of removing the de-
ceased from their sample, the authors impute poor health to them. This imputation could
drive their results.
We use IPW plus linear regression to estimate the ATT for the uninsured versus all in-
sured, for six normalized measures of health (mean= 0; standard deviation= 1, coded so
positive values indicate more disease/worse health): self-reported overall health; number
of difficulties with five activities of daily living (ADLs: taking a bath, dressing, eating, get-
ting out of bed, walking across the room); heart disease; stroke; diabetes; and depression
(Figure 6).20
An initial question is whether the health of the uninsured deteriorates relative to the
insured after wave 1. It does not. A second question is whether the health of the initially
uninsured improves relative to the previously insured in later waves, as the uninsured
reach age 65. Again, it does not. The ATT estimates are sometimes negative (suggesting
that health improves for the uninsured), sometimes positive, rarely statistically significant,
and bounce around a fair amount. To give one example, with IPW alone, average self-
reported health status for the uninsured in 1992, on a 1 (excellent) to 5 (poor) scale, is
2.96, versus 3.02 for the insured. Ten years later, the averages are again close, at 3.23 for
the initially uninsured versus 3.20 for the initially insured. Overall, there is no evidence
that initial uninsurance predicts changes in future health, either before or after Medicare
age.
20 We balance treated and controls onmost of these measures, so ATT estimates at year 0 are near zero and
are not reported in Figure 6. In unreported robustness checks, we find similar results using other methods.
We present results for six additional health measures in Online Appendix Figure G1.
302
Long-Term Effect of Health Insurance // black et al .
FIGURE 6. Health outcomes, ATT (linear analysis, inverse propensity weights)
Notes: ATT estimates from linear regression with IPW of indicated measures of health status for
each wave on treatment (uninsurance at wave 1) dummy and covariates. We normalize each
measure in each wave to mean = 0, σ = 1; positive values for health status indicate worse health.
The control group is all insured persons. The graphs show point estimates (as percentages of a
standard deviation) and 90 percent CI. Sample, trimming, covariates, and weights are the same as
for Figure 3, except that we omit the dependent variable as a covariate. Outcomes are self-reported
health status (1 = excellent to 5 = poor), number of difficulties in five activities of daily living
(taking a bath, dressing, eating, getting out of bed, walking across the room (0–5)), and whether the
respondent has ever had heart disease, stroke, diabetes, or depression.
We discuss here what one can say about relative health changes, at the risk of overin-
terpreting insignificant results. The HRS asks respondents to rate their health from 1 =
excellent to 5 = poor. The uninsured tend to report being in slightly worse health than
the insured in the early waves, and similar health in later waves. There is no evidence of
deterioration over time in health for the uninsured. The uninsured report somewhat fewer
difficulties with ADLs. Heart disease and stroke rates are similar. The uninsured tend to
have lower diabetes and depression rates. These lower rates could reflect less diagnosis
rather than less disease, but if so, one might expect rates for the uninsured to rise after
they reachMedicare age. Figure 6 shows no evidence of such a trend. The one measure on
which the Oregon Medicaid experiment showed a significant near-term impact of health
insurance on health was that the newly Medicaid-insured were less likely to be depressed
(Baicker et al. 2013; see also Polsky et al. 2009).We do not confirm that result for our sam-
ple. Across these measures, and the additional health measures we report in the Online
Appendix, Figure G1, the broad picture is of similar changes in health for the uninsured
and insured.21
21 The weak effect of insurance on health ameliorates one limitation of our research design: We estimate
propensities to be insured based on covariates measured at wave 1. If those covariates are affected by past
uninsurance (which is correlated with uninsurance at wave 1), this could bias our estimates.
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In unreported results, we estimate health for the uninsured separately versus private
controls and public controls. Consistent with our results for mortality, these results for
health suggest modest selection effects: positive selection (better health) for the privately
insured, and negative selection for the publicly insured. Neither comparison suggests that
access to health insurance significantly affects health.
VI. Discussion
A. SELECT ION B IAS AND CRED IBLE TREATMENT EFFECT EST IMATES
We do not show that health insurance has no effect on health or mortality. We do show
that (1) there is only mild evidence from the HRS that health insurance importantly af-
fects either mortality or health while alive; and (2) prior studies that found large positive
benefits from health insurance are flawed.
Selection effects pose a core challenge for any pure observational study. We believe we
were able to reduce themagnitude of these effects by fully exploiting the richHRS data set,
and taking great care with covariates and estimation methods. Our central estimates, for
the uninsured versus all insured, should be more reliable than estimates relative to private
controls alone or public controls alone. Those estimates are small and generally statistically
insignificant. Our upper bound estimates for the effect of uninsurance on mortality, rela-
tive to private controls, are well below the point estimates reported in most prior studies.
We also provide estimated treatment effects over time since initial treatment, and estimate
separate treatment effects for the uninsured and the insured.
B. I S A NEAR-ZERO EFFECT OF INSURANCE ON HEALTH
AND MORTAL I TY CRED IBLE?
Could our central ATT estimates, of a near-zero effect of initial uninsurance on mortality
through year 14, and small positive estimates after that, be “truth”? In our judgment, yes,
for several reasons.
We expect that health insurance affects health mainly through access to health care,
which in turn can affect health and mortality. We find, consistent with other studies, that
the insured consume more health-care resources, but the differences are not dramatic.
The additional marginal care that the insured receive may improve health in some spe-
cific situations,22 but worsen health, or make little difference, in others. Examples abound
in which additional care (or more expensive care, when a cheaper alternative is available)
is neutral or harmful for health. Insured women with health insurance were more likely to
receive hormone-replacement therapy in the 1990s, which raised breast cancer rates with-
out reducing heart disease rates. Insured men are more likely to receive prostate cancer
screening and follow-up testing and treatment, with no overall benefit; the testing alone
carries substantial mortality risk from infection. People with health insurance are more
likely to receive CT scans; the radiation exposure predicts higher future cancer rates. We
22 SeeWu and Shen (2011), higher heart attack mortality at hospitals that face larger Medicare reimburse-
ment cuts; and Doyle (2005), higher mortality for uninsured following car accidents.
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also know that areas with higher Medicare spending do not achieve better outcomes (e.g.,
Skinner 2012). Thus, even if health care is highly valuable on average, extra care at the
margin may be of modest value (Chandra and Skinner 2012).
A further explanation for small effects could be that theUnited States has a respectable,
if imperfect, safety net already in place. We insure the elderly, veterans, the disabled, and,
in part, the very poor. We provide emergency care to everyone. Public clinics exist, if not
everywhere. Many of the uninsured may have some access to savings or to borrowing to
finance needed care. Bankruptcy provides a safety valve if borrowing exceeds ability to
repay.23
C. BOUNDS ON TREATMENT EFFECTS
A common strategy, when selection effects are possible, is to provide bounds on the
likely estimates. Several approaches exist, ranging from ultraconservativeManski bounds,
which always include zero (Manski 1990), to conservative Rosenbaum bounds (Rosen-
baum 2009), to the somewhat less conservative bounds proposed by Hosman, Hansen,
and Holland (2010) and Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005); see also Oster (2016). Our ap-
proach is distinct from each of these.We use two different control groups, for which selec-
tion effects likely point in opposite directions, and estimate ATT for both groups, which
likely bound the true causal effect.24
Are we justified in viewing estimates versus the privately insured as an upper bound
on the true effects? Ifmost private insurance was individually purchased, one would worry
that the uninsuredmight be unobservably healthier, which could explain why they did not
buy insurance. However, this concern is offset by several factors. First, most people obtain
private insurance as a byproduct of being employed (which may predict unobserved good
health), rather than purchasing it directly. Second, insurers may seek to screen out the
less healthy by charging higher premiums, by excluding preexisting conditions, or by de-
clining coverage.We do know that the privately insured are observably healthier than their
uninsured counterparts. In unreported results, the observed health of the privately insured
who purchase health insurance is similar to those with employer-provided insurance.
D. TREATMENT EFFECTS OVER T IME
Prior studies of the impact of uninsurance on mortality or health generally provide esti-
mates at a single point in time. For example, MZMA estimate mortality eight years after
initial uninsurance. Most also have an observation period far shorter than the 20 years we
23 Another possible explanation for small effects is moral hazard—perhaps insured people are less careful
about their health. Prior evidence on whether health insurance induces significant moral hazard is mixed;
compare Bhattacharya et al. (2011) with Courtemanche and Zapata (2014). We balance the insured and
uninsured on initial weight and health behaviors such as smoking, drinking, and exercise. In unreported
results, the two groups follow similar time trends for these variables over our sample period.
24 This approach was proposed by Rosenbaum (1987); see also Rosenbaum (2010, § 8.2). Rosenbaum gen-
erously attributes the idea to an essay by Campbell (1969), who mentions “bracketing” a treatment effect in
a true experiment by using variation in observables. We see this as a different question. Shadish, Cook, and
Campbell (2002, 123–24) discuss using two different control groups to obtain bounds on treatment effects
and cite both Rosenbaum and Campbell.
305
AM E R I C A N J O U R N A L O F H E A LT H E C O N OM I C S
have available. In our view, there is much to be learned from time series estimates. First,
our near-zero central estimate through year 14 gains credibility because it is consistent
across waves.
Second, variation over time sheds light on the nature of both treatment effects and
selection effects. We find evidence for a slow, gradual emergence of a treatment effect, a
selection effect, or both in the later waves—although a treatment effect and SOUcould also
offset each other in earlier waves. A theory of how uninsurance affects long-run health or
mortality, and for whom, must address that time pattern.
E. LONGER-TERM UNINSURANCE
We treat uninsurance at wave 1 as a proxy for longer-run uninsurance or irregular insur-
ance. Could long-run uninsurance have larger health consequences than irregular insur-
ance? We cannot directly assess this question, because there are too few persons in our
sample who are uninsured across multiple consecutive waves to allow us to reliably esti-
mate treatment effects. But we do estimate treatment effects for the twice uninsured versus
the twice insured. Those estimates are similar to those for the initially uninsured versus
the initially insured.Moreover, a comparison of the twice uninsured to the once uninsured
provided no reason to believe that the twice uninsured are unobservably sicker than the
once uninsured.
VII. Conclusion
We provide both central estimates and upper and lower bounds for the long-run effects
of health insurance on health and mortality. Our central estimates for mortality are small
and statistically indistinguishable from zero through 14 years after initial observation, and
our upper bounds are well below the point estimates from prior observational studies.
Our central estimates for the effect of uninsurance on health while alive are also small
and statistically insignificant. Our estimates are almost surely affected by selection into
insurance status. Our goal has been to seek to limit the magnitude of selection effects and
to provide reasonable bounds on ATT estimates for the effect of health insurance.
Our results imply that in the longer run, much as other studies find in the near
term, health insurance does not have a large impact on overall health or mortality for
the near-elderly—a group of uninsured for which an effect might be plausible. This im-
plies that the health insurance expansion provided by the Affordable Care Act is not likely
to greatly affect overall population health or mortality. It may, of course, have an impact
on particular subgroups, such as diabetics, who could benefit from earlier diagnosis and
treatment.
We find lower health-care utilization by the initially uninsured in earlier waves, and
roughly equal utilization once both groups reach Medicare age, with a tilt toward lower
use by the previously uninsured. We find no evidence of a rebound effect. Once insured,
the initially uninsured do not consume more health care than the initially insured. The
moderate differences in utilization that we find—many of which likely involve marginal
choices to seek health care—are consistent with small resulting differences in health and
mortality.
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